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POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL ENABLERS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
IN THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN UGANDA: A MULTI-LEVEL AND PATH 
DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE 
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper explains the evident disproportionality in the levels of adoption 
of the modality of public-private partnerships (PPP) in Uganda by tracing the 
peculiar preconditions and enablers of the model’s relative high adoption in the 
electricity sector. 
Design/methodology/approach: Key conceptual suggestions from historical 
institutionalism (HI), critical juncture and path dependence are used to orient the 
data collection and analysis. The direct experiences and perceptions of key 
informants involved in policy, regulation and operations in the electricity sector are 
thematically analyzed. 
Findings: The primacy of specific policy, institutional decisions, and actions 
sequentially undertaken at the international, national and sectorial levels in shaping 
the conceivability and possibility of PPP modality is foregrounded. In particular, 
international advisory for the changed role of the state and the government’s 
subsequent decision to enact and reenact specific institutional frameworks at the 
national and sectorial levels created important disruptions to the status quo and 
paved a new and relatively stable institutional path conducive for private sector 
participation. 
Implications: Theoretically, the paper demonstrates the ability and power of HI to 
support the exploration and framing of multilevel and path-dependent explanations 
of institutional development and policy adoption. Practically, suggestions in terms of 
policy, legal and regulatory enablers for the adoption of PPP are made to shape 
practitioners’ decision making. 
Originality/value: The importance of considering factor combinations and 
sequences in explaining the emergence, adoption, and proliferation of public policy 
instruments and phenomena is underscored. In addition, the discourse on PPPs is 
moved beyond rationalization to how to even-out their adoption (and subsequently 
the associated benefits) across sectors.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The notion of private sector participation in public services provision and infrastructure 
development is now widely acknowledged (G. A. Hodge & Greve, 2007; Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse, & Summers, 2007; Mouraviev, 2013; Reeves, 2013). In addition to the traditional 
approaches of involving the private sector, such as contracting out, outsourcing and outright 
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privatisation, in the development and/or routine provision of tax-paid public services, the 
modality of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) has gained more prominence in recent decades 
(Al-Saadi & Abdou, 2016; Babatunde, Perera, Zhou, & Udeaja, 2016; Dempsey, Burton, & 
Selin, 2016; G. A. Hodge & Greve, 2007; Slater, 2001). 
PPPs are broadly understood as organisational arrangements whereby the public sector enters 
into long-term contractual agreement with private sector entities for the construction or 
management of public sector infrastructure facilities by the private sector entity, or the provision 
of services by the private sector entity on behalf of a public sector entity (Bovaird, 2010; 
Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004b; Koppenjan, 2005). In many 
countries, PPPs have over the last two decades gained a standing as critical pillars of 
contemporary public management practice (G. Hodge & Greve, 2010; Weihe, 2006; Wettenhall, 
2010). 
The diversity of arenas of the rationalisation of the modality is abounding. In particular, PPPs are 
justified as tools with which to address fiscal and inefficiency challenges (Landow & Ebdon, 
2012; Stafford & Stapleton, 2017), the complexity or „wickedness‟ of public problems 
(Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011; Gray & Stites, 2013; Pinkse & Kolk, 2012), risk exposures (J. 
M. Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2015; Currie & Teague, 2015; Velotti, Botti, & Vesci, 2012), and 
in some respects as a compromise approach to the parallelism in public services management 
ideologies (Bradford, 2003; Heuer, 2011; Vurro, Dacin, & Perrini, 2010).  
Arising mainly as a consequence of diverse rationales, since the early 2000s, many countries 
have strengthened practical efforts to launch PPPs as an important framework of public services 
and infrastructure provision (Bank, 2015; World Bank, 2017, 2018) in a wide range of economic 
and social sectors (Fischbacher & Beaumont, 2003; Reeves & Ryan, 2007; Yuan, Skibniewski, 
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Li, & Zheng, 2009). In last two decades, PPPs have been a major attraction in many developing 
countries, especially as they are seen as an opportunity to bridge endemic fiscal gaps (Bouman, 
Friperson, Gielen, & Wilms, 2013; Bovis, 2013; Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2017). Indeed, the World 
Bank‟s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database on low, lower-middle income and 
upper-middle income countries, for instance, indicates an increase in the number of PPI projects 
from 2,346 PPI between 1995 and 1999 to 6,792 PPI projects between 2000 and 2019. In the 
sub-Saharan region alone, the number of PPI projects that reached financial close rose to 472 
from 102 in the years between 2000-2019 and 1995-1999, respectively (World Bank, 2019).  
Notwithstanding the evidence of the increased number of PPI projects implemented in 
developing countries (DCs), the significant disproportionality in the spread across different 
sectors is evident (Lee, Xuehui, Quising, & Villaruel, 2018; World Bank, 2019). For instance, of 
the 17 sectors profiled in the PPI database, the electricity subsector, in particular, appears to have 
generated more attention. Out of the 472 projects that reached financial close between the years 
2000 and 2019, 271 are in the electricity sector. In Uganda, of the 25 projects that reached 
financial close in the same period, 22 – nearly 90% – of these projects are in the electricity 
sector. This places Uganda among the DCs with highest private participation in the electricity 
subsector relative to other sectors (World Bank, 2019).  
While the extant literature appears to explain increasing private sector participation from a range 
of transaction cost economics and resource-based lenses, particularly focused on the fiscal 
constraints (Bovis, 2013; Boyer, 2016; Stafford & Stapleton, 2017) and rampant public sector 
inefficiencies (Birner & Wittmer, 2006; Hayllar, 2010), these explanations are challenged by the 
evident disproportionality in levels of private sector participation across sectors in DC contexts 
where constraints and inefficiencies indiscriminately apply. In other words, there appear to be 
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specific enabling, yet also obscure, conditions for the peculiar increase in PPPs in the electricity 
sector. This paper posits that if the heralded benefits of PPP modality are to be reflected across 
different sectors of DC economies, the focus on spreading their adoption is central. In that 
regard, and as has been suggested elsewhere (see for e.g. John M Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 
2006; Chen, 2010; Pittz & Adler, 2016), it is critical to emphasise and move the discourse 
beyond the rationalisation of the modality to understand the antecedent preconditions and 
enablers in their contexts. 
This paper draws on the key actor experiences to foreground important preconditions and 
enablers that explain the significant increase in PPPs in the electricity sector over the last two 
decades. This aim is operationalized by answering the following questions: What factors explain 
the increased adoption of PPP modality in the electricity sector? How can these be organized and 
sequenced? What implications for PPP policy, practice and future research can be derived? As is 
detailed later, the evidence suggests that the response to the international advisory on the need 
for a changed role of the state in public services provision, from provider to enabler, has 
generated disruptions to the public services delivery model status quo and paved a new and 
relatively stable institutional order conducive for private participation. The paper is of interest to 
public policy actors and PPP practitioners interested in extending the modality to other sectors 
and to researchers seeking perspectives on empirical context-specific and path-dependent 
enablers for PPPs. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section two unpacks and rationalizes the key 
notions of historical institutionalism as the theoretical frame of reference. In particular, critical 
junctures and path dependence are emphasized as orienting concepts for the analysis of evidence 
and the discussion of findings. Section three identifies and explains the methods and materials 
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used, specifically elaborating protocols for the collation and analysis of the empirical evidence. 
Section four presents the key findings and focuses on identifying and illustrating the important 
institutional decisions and actions undertaken, sequentially organized in three levels. In section 
five, a discussion of the findings in the context of applied theory and extant research is 
undertaken, along with delineation of the key implications followed by the conclusion. 
THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Historical institutionalism (HI) provides useful insights into understanding the proliferating 
phenomenon of private sector participation in public services provision, especially the adoption 
of the modality PPPs. HI is one of the three strands of new institutionalism, alongside rational 
choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism (Campbell & Pedersen, 2001; Hall & 
Taylor, 1996). HI places primacy on the empirical and historical perspective in the study of 
institutions, purposed on explaining individual and collective behavior (Campbell & Pedersen, 
2001).  
HI spreads the conception of institutions beyond the realm of organizations to incorporate formal 
and informal sets of rules, procedures, policy legacies, norms and conventions that are embedded 
in the organizational structure of polity (Hall & Taylor, 1996). While HI is viewed as „a rather 
loose collection of writings by authors that tend to mix elements of rationalistic and 
constructivist explanations – or the “calculus” versus the “cultural” approach‟ (Immergut, 2006), 
the framework‟s potency for this study lies in its emphasis on the constraints that institutional 
structures impose on social and political behavior (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Steinmo, 2008; Thelen, 
2002). In particular, HI sees policy decisions as being historically constructed and institutionally 
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embedded in a system composed of interacting parts that shape the social identities and political 
strategies of individual and collective actors over time.  
As an analytical approach, HI is associated with two important concepts that are particularly 
useful for our analysis in this investigation. The first concept is „path dependence‟, which draws 
on institutional economics and postulates institutional change to be heavily constrained by past 
policy choices (Steinmo, 2008; Thelen, 1999). The second concept is „critical juncture‟, 
according to which important shocks and crises can disrupt the institutional status quo and 
trigger fundamental changes before a new, relatively stable order emerges in the form of a new 
historical and institutional path (Campbell & Pedersen, 2001; Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007; Hall 
& Taylor, 1996). In other words, critical junctures represent turning points that are shown to 
have established important institutional parameters that subsequently shape what is politically 
possible, even conceivable. This means that during critical junctures, institutional arrangements 
may adopt a new path that is generally hard to alter because it is embedded in relatively stable 
rules, practices, and vested interests (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007; Immergut, 2006). Critical 
junctures thus become potential starting points for path-dependent processes. 
Placing emphasis on continuity and historical contingency in institutional development as the 
conceptual premises, path dependence and critical junctures emerge as powerful analytical tools 
for uncovering concerns relating to the origins and drivers of important policy arrangements and 
modalities, such as PPPs, in a particular context. This study draws on these concepts to orient the 
analysis of empirical evidence. As is later demonstrated, HI provides unique insights into how 
specific moments and the decisions and actions of different actors at the international, national 
and sectorial levels interacted to create uniquely conducive institutional conditions that made 
PPPs conceivable and possible in Uganda‟s electricity sector.  
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
This case study investigation is based on a qualitative research paradigm. As a method of 
inquiry, a case study denotes an intensive investigation into a single case (bounded system) or set 
of cases (multiple bounded systems with the intention to deeply explore and understand complex 
social phenomena (Creswell, Hanson, Clark Plano, & Morales, 2007; Yin, 2011). The 
arrangement of private sector participation in public services provision, particularly through 
PPPs, is very complex owing to a myriad of contextual peculiarities. Some of these relate to 
differences in partner perspectives, interests and preferences, compounded by the varieties of 
actor constellations that are foregrounded at different phases (Hertogh & Westerveld, 2010; 
Ward & Chapman, 2008). Indeed, as Figure 1 portrays, the sector‟s complexity in the case of 
Uganda is evident in the multiplicity of actors in the depicted electricity service value chain.  
In addition, case-based investigations are particularly helpful for explaining phenomena with 
theories (Levy, 2008; Yin, 2011) as well as for in-depth historical and institutional assessments, 
both of which fit the intention, design and context of this investigation. 
This investigation is based on primary and secondary data. The primary data were obtained from 
face-to-face interviews with 28 key individuals (a) in the government, particularly in policy work 
within the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development and other government departments like 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, (b) national legislation, (c) electricity 
sector regulation, (d) participating public and private sector companies, and (e) international 
consultants familiar with the sector and modality, as reflected in the appendix 1 of the 
supplementary material.  
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Given the historical approach and the empirical context of this study, a snowballing technique 
(Browne, 2005; Miles & Huberman, 1994) was considered more relevant to collate the data. 
Specifically, in light of limited experiences with the PPP modality in Uganda and the 
commercial confidentiality associated with PPP transactions, snowballing presented the best 
option to reach participants. Other PPP scholars studying similar contexts have found this 
technique equally useful for its ability to allow researchers to harness existing trust and 
relationships among informants (see, for example, Beyene, 2014; Chung, 2009; Opawole & 
Jagboro, 2017). The interview data were complemented by a review of a range of exclusively 
availed and publicly available documents listed in appendix 2 of the supplementary material. The 
ascertainment and sourcing of the relevant documents were conducted alongside the interviews 
with informants, who were asked to suggest and/or avail any informative documentation.  
All the audio files were uploaded to NVIVO qualitative data analysis software, where the 
transcription was conducted and the text data subsequently analyzed. Content analysis was 
conducted to identify high-level concepts in the data that could offer key ideas and actionable 
insights. This analysis involved the careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation 
of the interview and documentary data to identify patterns, themes, biases, and meanings (Hsieh 
& Shannon, 2005). As delineated earlier, the analysis was oriented by the concepts of critical 
junctures and path dependence from the applied theoretical lens. The data coding was performed 
in phases. In the first phase, important segments of data indicating or relating to decisions and 
actions undertaken were coded. In the second phase, data-grounded themes were generated 
accordingly through a reinterpretation of coded decisions and decision groups (see appendix 3 in 
the supplementary material for the codebook). These categories and corresponding decisions are 
presented and illustrated in the findings.  
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National and Sectorial Context 
The involvement of the private sector in the early stages of the economic liberalization agenda 
mainly involved the outright privatization of formerly government-owned business entities. By 
1986, Uganda had over 130 government business enterprises. At the urging of the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by June 30, 2011, the government had conducted 95 
sell-off transactions and 39 liquidations (Uganda News Releases, 2015). Earlier on, in order to 
enable the process, the Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture Act (PERD) of 1993 was 
enacted.  
The PERD Act created three classes of public enterprises and prescribed the modality for private 
sector participation. In the first class, the state is required to retain 100% shareholding in these 
enterprises. This class includes seven enterprises, some of which are the Civil Aviation 
Authority, Cotton Development Authority, and National Social Security Fund. Added to this 
class were any regulatory agencies formed as a result of sectorial reforms. In the second class, 
the Act stipulated that the government retain majority shareholding. Some examples in this class 
of 14 enterprises include Uganda Electricity Board (which is the main sector focus of this study), 
Housing Finance Company of Uganda Limited, National Medical Stores, and National Water 
and Sewerage Corporation. In the third class, 88 enterprises were to be divested following the 
prescribed legal guidelines. The third-class enterprises were mainly divested through sale of 
assets, share sale, joint ventures and pre-emptive rights. The others were disposed of through 
other approaches, such as public offerings, concessions, auctions, debt equity swaps and 
repossessions (Bennell, 1997; Tangri, 1999).  
As this paper later illustrates, these policy and institutional decisions arguably set the initial tone 
for the mutual interest and prolonged interaction between the government and the private sector 
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in an institutionalized and/or contractually binding way, creating part of the foundation for PPPs 
in Uganda.  
The cross-sectorial institutional setup of the PERD Act notwithstanding, the disproportionate 
proliferation of the PPP modality in the electricity sector relative to others following the PERD 
Act is the explanatory focus of this paper. As highlighted, the value chain components open to 
private participation, that is, electricity generation and distribution, account for 22 of the 25 PPP 
projects (24 active and 1 distressed) reported currently the World Bank Private Participation in 
Infrastructure (PPI) database. The others are in the transport, water and telecommunications 
sectors (World Bank, 2017, 2019). 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Our analysis of the evidence reveals the primacy and sequence of a number of factors and 
decisions that were instrumental in making the adoption of PPPs in the electricity sector in 
Uganda conceivable and possible. We present and illustrate these factors in three important 
thematic categories, namely (a) the influence of international agenda for liberalization and 
deregulation, (b) the national public sector reform process, and (c) the specific electricity sector 
institutional reforms. 
The International Drive for Liberalization, Deregulation and Privatization 
The interview indicates that the fundamental influence of the international agenda for 
liberalization and the proliferating drive for the deregulation and privatization provided an 
important foundation for the eventual adoption of PPPs in the electricity sector. In this regard, 
the instrumental role played by international and multilateral lending agencies in shaping the 
decisions processes at the national level was emphasized by interviewees (Interview 1, 2018; 
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Interview 3, 2018; Interview 8, 2018; Interview 10, 2018). In particular, the ideological push for 
the involvement of the private sector was strong, which most governments in developing 
countries resist (Interview 8, 2018; Interview 10, 2018; Interview 13, 2018). As an interviewee 
observed in the following quote: 
It was an ideological drive; you know, when the ocean comes even if you do not want the 
water will come, yes. So the things started coming so government said OK. They first 
resisted and later they said OK. (Interview 13, 2018) 
The interviewees simultaneously pointed to the nature of the conditions attached. In particular, the 
interviewees noted that the international lending agencies set an inevitable direction towards the 
participation of the private sector (Interview 8, 2018; Interview 10, 2018; Interview 14, 2018). As 
one interviewee specifically observed in the following quote, attaching government borrowing to 
the involvement of the private sector was particularly significant. 
It (Government) would not borrow. You see the world economic thinking is shaped in 
certain places if they say this is what can work, everybody has to follow that. Now the idea 
of government running some of these institutions, they found it offensive, the western 
money markets, the government was being accused of being inefficient, leading to loss of 
colossal sums of money and so on. In order to cure this, everything should be passed on 
the private sector (Interview 8, 2018). 
Similarly, the interviewees pointed to decisions by political leaders to align with the international 
trends on private sector involvement, which subsequently raised the national-level momentum 
(Interview 14, 2018). In particular, there arose principal support from the highest levels of political 
leadership for private sector involvement and for the changed role of the state, which increased the 
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momentum and generated the urgency for the involvement of the private sector in government 
business (Interview 10, 2018; Interview 14, 2018; Interview 16, 2018; Interview 17, 2018). As the 
excerpt below suggests, the political leadership‟s embracing the idea of privatization set an 
important pace at the national level.  
…we were a bit ahead because of the World Bank supported programme, on liberalization 
and privatization, so we went head on. And the President (President of the Republic of 
Uganda) at the time had a political will. The President actually was at the forefront of the 
programme. So, we went for privatization and typically it was just to give everything that 
you can to the private sector, let government get out of business………… I remember there 
was even a time when the President said, I don’t care, if it means handing the ministries 
(government ministries) to the private sector, I will do it (Interview 14, 2018) 
As the above illustrates, the advent of liberalization, deregulation and privatization across the 
globe appears to have set the pace and the initial drive for the involvement of the private sector in 
Uganda‟s infrastructure. As the interviewees suggested, this set the policy foundation for sharing 
the public mandate between the private and public sector. This policy direction would later be 
structured and enabled through significant institutional sector reform processes at the national 
level. 
The Public Sector Institutional Reform Processes 
The evidence also points to the set of instrumental decisions under the public sector reform 
processes that set a broader institutional foundation for private sector participation. At the national 
level, the different sets of decisions consolidated under the Public Enterprises Reform and 
Divestiture Act of 1993 were instrumental ("Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture Act," 
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1993). In particular, an instructive role was played, on the one hand, by the decision to map and 
classify the enterprises and, on the other hand, the definition of the government stake and 
shareholding in those enterprises (see "Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture Act," 1993). 
The quote below from the former head of the Privatization Unit provides an illustration. 
The PERD Act classified the categories where at that point in time we were tossing around 
where government would retain some shareholding and where government would concede 
the entire holding with the private sector and where government was set to retain majority 
shareholding. Now, the thinking was beginning to formulate at that time that there are 
certain segment of businesses or businesses that you cannot just hand over to the private 
sector, so the awareness came into play (Interview 14, 2018). 
Specifically, it appears the enterprise categorization as was enshrined in the law helped to foretell 
and lock in the modes of involvement of the private sector. In that way, the decision paved the 
way for the legal conceivability and possibility of private sector involvement in government 
business. At the national level, the application of the institutional framework, in this case the 
PERD Act, would have maintained the private participation within the classified enterprises and 
only in the modes envisaged. However, the later sector-specific decisions and actions appear to 
have generated more impetus within the electricity sector. 
Electricity Sector Institutional Reforms 
The third set of decisional drivers is made at the sector level and is particularly important in this 
case. Broadly, the interviewees pointed to the centrality of the decisions contained in the 
revisions and amendments made to the Electricity Act of 1999 in setting up more and peculiar 
enabling conditions for private sector involvement (Interview 3, 2018; Interview 8, 2018; 
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Interview 9, 2018; Interview 12, 2018; Interview 23, 2018; Interview 24, 2018). As this quote, 
for instance, prefaces, the revisions opened up more possibility for private participation, albeit 
within a prior specific participation modality. 
So, (the) decision to amend the electricity act was taken and in 1999 a new law, a new 
statute, was put in place, the Electricity Act of 1999. And essentially this opened up the 
power sector to independent power producers (and) to a number of other operators that 
were not necessarily government (Interview 8, 2018). 
Specifically, two important decisions and actions are underscored by the interview evidence: the 
establishment of an independent regulatory authority and the unbundling of the sector. The 
evidence highlights that the decision to establish an independent regulatory authority importantly 
provided potential private sector actors with the necessary confidence and assurance of the 
protection of their interests. As the following excerpt specifically illuminates, in the absence of 
prior experience with the involvement of private actors in the electricity sector, it appears that the 
existence of an independent regulator was a necessary precondition. 
…..in that framework there were some conditionality which the private sector had 
provided, they said if you want us to come in the energy space, you must have an Energy 
Act repealed and amended so they (Government) amended it. They brought in the 
regulator, they (private sector) said we want somebody to come in and regulate the 
energy sector because by then it was Uganda Electricity Board (UEB), U.E.B was the 
regulator, generator, and was the supplier. So they (private sector) said they want 
somebody who oversees the sector and somebody who is going to provide the tariff, to 
provide a license, and all this sanity in the energy sector (Interview 13, 2018). 
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Similarly, putting in place an independent regulatory authority was seen as a necessary link to 
regulate the relationship between the private operator and service users, who are the citizens 
(Interview 3, 2018; Interview 4, 2018; Interview 9, 2018). Again, with the limited experience of 
the private sector in public services provision, the modality was therefore new to many 
stakeholders, including the citizenry. As result, the management of public opinion in the context 
of such a new phenomenon appears to be one of the preconditions addressed by the regulation 
(Interview 9, 2018; Interview 27, 2018). In addition, key elements of the interaction would be 
framed by the independent regulation and would thus provide the necessary protection for the 
private providers of the service and to other stakeholders, as the two following excerpts directly 
illuminate. 
So, government took a decision to separate the regulation from day-to-day running of the 
business but they left the policy in the hands of Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Development (Interview 8, 2018).  
Then they (government) said we shall put in a regulator to oversee you guys, your 
operation, pricing and to protect the interest of the customer and public (Interview 3, 
2018).  
Secondly, the decision to unbundle the sector appears to have been central to enabling the 
involvement of the private actors. Separating the key aspects of the sector‟s vertically integrated 
value chain into distinct business units (generation, transmission, and distribution), as well as the 
subsequent decision to retain the transmission segment under complete government mandate, 
was noted by many interviewees as an important decision that made the involvement of the 
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private sector both conceivable and possible (Interview 3, 2018; Interview 8, 2018; Interview 12, 
2018; Interview 14, 2018; Interview 21, 2018). As one interviewee explained:  
First of all, remove the vertical integration and split it (electricity service value chain) 
into units and then look at which business units the private sector would take. ….. 
(Electricity) generation is easy, distribution is not so easy but it is also easier than 
transmission. And the people (private sector) that you bring in to do the other two 
(generation and transmission) need a middle man who is trusted by government that that 
is Uganda Electricity Transmission Company Limited (UETC) (Interview 21, 2018). 
Specifically, the evidence suggests more enabling circumstances created by the unbundling 
decision by way of reducing the complexity of the electricity service value chain, facilitating the 
ascertainment of commercial viability and the clarification of critical policy interest aspects of 
the electricity service value chain (Interview 3, 2018; Interview 12, 2018; Interview 13, 2018). 
The evidence specifically indicates that by creating the business unit distinctiveness, the 
necessary assessment of each unit‟s possible attractiveness, feasibility and viability for private 
sector involvement was enabled. As a government minister explained below: 
And it (the electricity sector) was vertically integrated, generation, transmission and 
distribution (the) same entity. But in order now to get private people to come to the 
sector, we had to unbundle, transmission remained government. Transmission remained 
government because we thought it was like a highway. Now distribution was privatized so 




In all, the evidence points to the centrality of a specific sequence of decisions and actions that 
preluded the involvement of private actors. These decisions and actions created alterations to the 
established institutional status quo involving direct electricity service delivery by the government 
and through a vertically integrated organizational structure under the former establishment of the 
Uganda Electricity Board. The following section discusses some of the decisions and actions 
relating to the three sequential phases at the international, national and sectorial levels in light of 
the theoretical and extant research. 
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS OF THE POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL 
ENABLERS OF PPPS 
This analysis has delineated the important policy and institutional explanations for the observed 
proliferation of the PPP modality in the electricity sector in Uganda. Based on key notions from 
the HI perspective, the analysis has underscored the primacy of three important sequential phases 
and the attendant ideological and institutions-focused decisions and actions. The emphasis here 
is on key decisions that created important disruptions to the direct public delivery of electricity, 
thereby laying an important institutional foundation for the PPP modality in the sector. 
Firstly, the evidence has pointed to the influence of international trends and the shift towards to 
the economic liberalization, deregulation and privatization that provided an overarching context 
for the involvement of the private sector in public services in Uganda. In this case, it particularly 
appears that the decision by the international lending agencies to condition government 
borrowing on the government working with the private sector incentivized political leaders‟ 
attitudes and the subsequent government policy on the involvement of the private sector.  
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Consistent with the premises of HI, the finding suggests that such decisions by the multilateral 
lenders closed off alternative options, particularly the option to continue with the direct public 
services provision by the government, and simultaneously established a new institutional path for 
the involvement of the private sector in public services provision. The context thus created 
mirrors the assumption of path dependence, whereby in the course of institutional development, 
self-triggering and self-reinforcing processes beyond the control of individuals or individual 
organizations, irrespective of their level of influence, are set in motion. This mirrors a fairly 
recent observation in which the sustainability of trans-border partnerships was found to be 
dependent on major rules governing the system of cooperation (Szmigiel-Rawska, 2016). 
Similarly, the influence of multilateral agencies in driving private sector participation is not an 
isolated finding of this investigation. The pressures on developing countries from international 
financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to shift to an 
efficient system, to an enabler role of the government and to adopt the principles of market 
liberalization and privatization abound (Hughes, 1998; Jamali, 2004; Peters, 2000). Specific 
references, for instance, have often been made to financial assistance being conditioned for 
governments in developing countries, changing the focus and orientation of governing from 
direct involvement and intervention to a role revolving around partnership and facilitation 
(Hughes, 1998; P. Lawrence, 2002). Indeed, the broader and longstanding attribution of PPP 
evolution over the past decades has been associated with donor-country development thinking as 
a central component of foreign policy toward developing countries (Bouman et al., 2013; P. 
Lawrence, 2002; T. B. Lawrence, Phillips, & Hardy, 1999; Mitchell-Weaver & Manning, 1991) 
Secondly, the legal and policy adjustments appear to have provided a fundamental institutional 
setup at the national level. Although it is evident that the ideological premises at the international 
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level, in the preceding discussion, rendered huge impetus for private sector participation, the 
enactment of the Public Enterprise Reform and Divesture (PERD) Act in 1993 actively enabled 
the ideals at the national level. It would be difficult to envisage a starting point for the 
operationalization of any form of private participation, in the context of long-standing direct 
public services provision of public services, in the absence of an enabling institutional 
framework.  
In this case, the instructive nature of the PERD Act is central as it classified the public assets and 
defined the extent of government ownership and involvement in management. The enactment of 
the Act importantly shaped and simplified the actions of policy actors. As has been elaborated 
earlier, it is clearly traceable that the decision to enact such an instructive legal framework 
heightened the general possibility of private sector participation at the national level. 
Thirdly, at the sector level, the decision to unbundle the vertically integrated sector into three 
distinct business units of generation, transmission and distribution proved significantly 
instructive. By reducing the complexity of the sector and clarifying the services value chain, the 
government of Uganda enabled the private sector to more clearly assess the commercial viability 
of investing in the sector. While it appears that the sector was generally understood to be 
inefficiently operated, it was not possible to clearly understand the more ineffective phases of the 
value chain. As such, it was not possible to determine what needed to be done by the different 
stakeholders to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the sector.  
Ironically, bundling key components of the service or infrastructure value chain has specifically 
been a hallmark of PPPs‟ engagement, whereby the private partner takes responsibility for the 
entire service or infrastructure value chain (Boyer, 2016; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004a; Hueskes, 
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Verhoest, & Block, 2017). However, this case has instead revealed the primacy of unbundling 
the service value chain as an important precursor to private sector participation. While this 
observation appears to contradict a widely acknowledged character trait of PPP engagement, it is 
consistent with emerging observations cautioning against bundling. For instance, a fairly recent 
study of the Flemish Sports Infrastructure Program (Van den Hurk & Verhoest, 2015) warned 
against opting for „big bang‟ bundled programs as these entail more significant risks and tend to 
be more difficult to co-ordinate and manage. Consistent with our observation in this paper, the 
study concludes that in the context of a complex project, it is less risky to opt for a cautious, 
incremental approach, with a simple governance structure.  
Similarly, while the notion of deregulation is one of the overriding premises for the involvement 
of the private sector, the particular findings of this study also suggest the primacy of its converse, 
regulation, as a precondition for private sector involvement in public services provision. In 
particular, the mutual requirement revealed in this case for the establishment of an independent 
regulatory authority by both the government and prospective private sector investors makes two 
important suggestions. From the public sector perspective, it suggests the need to guard against 
private interest capture and possible collusion against public interest. On the other hand, the 
private sector expects that the independent regulation moderates the possible public interest 
capture and power play. In the context of PPPs characterized by information and experience 
asymmetry between partners (Boyer, 2016), independent regulation appears to enable rather than 
disable the model‟s adoption, as the reality of this case has illustrated. 
Revisiting Historical Institutionalism, Policy, and Research Implications 
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The findings of this study reinforce the important premises of HI as an analytical framework as 
they underscore the primacy of important occurrences and the significance of decisional 
sequences and timing. In this way, the findings demonstrate the ability and power of HI to 
support exploration, framing multilevel and path-dependent explanations for institutional 
development and policy adoption.  
From a practical perspective, the study has helped to identify the important policy, legal and 
regulatory enablers for the adoption of the PPP modality in the electricity sector. In so doing, this 
paper generates important clarity between two strands of explanation for PPP proliferation in the 
sector. In particular, this paper creates a necessary perspective that distinguishes the more 
dominant narrative focused on the rationale for PPPs – emphasizing the theoretical benefits of 
partnership on the one hand – and enablers of PPPs – emphasizing the important preconditions 
and facilitative factors of PPP modality on the other hand.  
As noted earlier, despite PPP proliferation, this distinction has been underemphasized, and 
sometimes conflated, with the focus on understanding specific and context-specific enablers 
largely relegated in the extant discourse – except for a few conceptual and overarching studies 
focused on cross-sector collaborations (e.g. John M Bryson et al., 2006), those drawing on 
broader considerations of PPP success and failure (e.g. Jamali, 2004), and others drawing on 
influence of exceptional natural circumstances (e.g. Simo & Bies, 2007). In addition, since 
enablers, as opposed to rationalizations, are context specific, it is less likely that inferring and 




While the findings of the study have insightfully provided important historical and multilevel 
institutional drivers to explain the evident proliferation of the PPP modality in the electricity 
sector in Uganda, it is important to note that this study is not without limitations. Firstly, we 
acknowledge that the use of the notion of private sector participation and the concept of PPP may 
elicit confusion as they appear to be used interchangeably. While PPP is indeed a form of private 
sector participation, not every form of private sector participation is a PPP. For instance, this 
paper does not consider the traditional contracting out, outsourcing and privatization as PPPs, 
although they may often be confused as such. The deliberate attempts to clarify this distinction 
notwithstanding, it is an acknowledgement in this paper that some of the interviewees 
particularly used the concept of privatization instead of PPP.  
Similarly, while the identification of context-specific variables and patterns undertaken in this 
study is important, some may view this as detracting from the broader task of discovering the 
general drivers for PPP adoption that hold across time and space. In particular, first, this study is 
cognizant that by focusing on the electricity sector, it is not possible to directly infer that similar 
institutional factors could elicit an identical impact in other sectors of the economy in Uganda or 
elsewhere. Secondly, the evidence has been analyzed from a peculiar theoretical lens, namely 
historical institutionalism. Although we have provided an important rationale for this decision, 
the possibility remains that potentially important explanations for the proliferation of PPP in the 
sector and country may have been left out.  
Thirdly, the interviews required retrospection from interviewees, some for as long as 14 years. 
Although these experiences are corroborated by publicly available documentary evidence, they 
may have been affected by any memory losses. Finally, while this qualitative study has helped to 
map the important drivers, it was not possible to determine the relative extents to which the 
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various drivers impacted on the decision to adopt the modality of PPPs in the sector. In other 
words, the levels of importance of the different factors remain unclear.  
In light of these methodological drawbacks, a sequential mixed study may be useful. Qualitative 
meta-synthesis of extant empirical evidence would delineate drivers that transcend historical or 
regional contexts, and a survey of these drivers among the policy actors would help determine 
their relative influence. It may also be useful to explore the nature of the influence (if any) that 
the nascent national legislation, specifically the enactment of the PPP Act in 2015, has had on 
adoption of the PPP model in terms of private sector participation within and/or outside the 
electricity sector. In particular, it would be interesting to see whether the enactment of the PPP 
Act is facilitating an even greater spread of PPPs across sectors than has been witnessed over the 
last two decades. 
CONCLUSION 
In a nutshell, this paper foreshadowed the multilevel and path-dependent institutional 
explanations for the increased adoption of the PPPs in Uganda‟s electricity sector. Based on the 
evidence, this paper posits that at the national level, the drive towards private sector participation 
in public infrastructure and services was highly influenced by the domestication of the neoliberal 
ideals on the changed role of the state through the enactment of different sets of institutional 
frameworks at the national and sectorial levels. In turn, the new sets of institutional framework at 
the sectorial level disrupted the institutional status quo by closing off the option of direct 
(traditional) provision by public agencies, thus establishing a stable path to various modes of 






1. Uganda first developed a national PPP policy in 2010, which culminated in the enactment 
of the PPP Act 2015. Both the policy and the Act had no retrospective effect and are, in 
practice to date, only an alternative institutional arrangement for engagement with the 
private sector. 
2. Prior to the enactment of the PPP Act, all interactions between the government and public 
sector agencies and private sector entities for the provision of public services and/or 
management and operation of public assets were governed by the Public Enterprise 
Reform (PERD) Act 1993 and Public Procurement and Disposal Public Asset (PPDA) 
Act 2003. 
3. The PERD and PPPA laws were complemented by the specific sector laws and 
regulations, such as the Electricity Act 1999 for the electricity sector, and any others 
where they exist. 
4. The colloquial use of the concept of privatization in reference to any form of private 
sector participation in services provision and public asset operations and management is 
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Figure 1: Structure of Uganda’s Electricity Sector 
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